Given the significance of violations and crimes committed by credit institutions, governments take rigorous regulatory measures, design criminal sanctions, and implement non-criminal strategies to safeguard norms in this sector. In Iran, weaknesses in legislative infrastructure, the multiplicity of regulatory bodies issuing banking licenses, the inexperience of relevant institutions in managing such criminal phenomena, and the lack of expertise in the financial supervisory body during the early stages of these institutions' criminal operations contributed to the emergence of the credit institution crisis in the country. This crisis escalated into a national security concern due to mass protests by depositors in front of government institutions and the involvement of opposition media. Ultimately, it was resolved through the cooperation of the three branches of government, the allocation of credit lines, substantial liquidity injections by the Central Bank, and the resultant inflationary burden on various segments of society. While multiple studies have examined different aspects of legal norm violations by these institutions, there has been a lack of research on the social factors contributing to this criminal phenomenon and the role of social prevention strategies. In particular, the role of citizen behavior management in responding effectively to this issue has been overlooked. This article, using a descriptive-analytical approach, aims to elucidate the role of social prevention in managing this criminal phenomenon. By analyzing past cases, interpreting the relevant legal frameworks governing central banking regulations, and drawing upon insights from social sciences, criminology, and behavioral economics, the study highlights the necessity for policymakers to address the underlying motivations of citizen behavior. It advocates for a focus on models of social choice engineering as a fundamental strategy for strengthening community-based crime prevention in the financial and banking sectors.